The paper deals with resilient state estimation of cyber-physical systems subject to switching signal attacks and fake measurement injection. In particular, the random set paradigm is adopted in order to model the switching nature of the signal attack and the fake measurement injection via Bernoulli and/or Poisson random sets. The problem of jointly detecting a signal attack and estimating the system state in presence of fake measurements is then formulated and solved in the Bayesian framework leading to the analytical derivation of a hybrid Bernoulli filter that updates in real-time the joint posterior density of the detection attack Bernoulli set and of the state vector. Exploiting a Gaussian-mixture implementation of the filter, a numerical example is developed in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are complex engineered systems arising from the integration of computational components and physical processes, tightly connected by a communication infrastructure. Typical examples of CPSs include next-generation systems in electric power grids, transportation and mobility, building and environmental monitoring/control, health-care, and industrial process control. While on one hand, the progress in CPS technology will enable growing autonomy, efficiency, seamless interoperability and cooperation, on the other hand the increased interaction between cyber and physical realms is inevitably introducing novel security vulnerabilities, which render CPSs subject to non-standard malicious threats. Recent real-world attacks such as the Maroochy Shire sewage spill, the Stuxnet worm sabotaging an industrial control system, and the lately reported massive power outage against Ukrainian electric grid [1] , have brought into particularly sharp focus the urgency of designing secure CPSs. In presence of malicious threats against CPSs, standard approaches extensively used for control systems subject to benign faults and failures are no longer suitable. This is why recent advances on the design of secure systems have explored different paths. Preliminary studies addressed the problems of attack detection/identification, and proposed attack monitors for deterministic control systems [2] . In addition, active detection methods have been designed in order to reveal stealthy attacks via manipulation of e.g. control inputs [3] and dynamics [4] . In recent times, the problem of secure state estimation, i.e. capable of reconstructing the state even when the CPS of interest is under attack, has gained considerable attention [5] , [6] . Under the assumption of linear systems subject to an unknown but bounded number of false-data injection attacks, the problem for a noise-free system has been cast into an 0 −optimization problem, which can be relaxed as a more efficient convex problem [7] , and later adapted to systems with bounded noise [8] . Further advances try to tackle the combinatorial complexity of the problem [9] . Lately, the most popular types of attack have been modeled based on adversary's resources and system knowledge [10] , and resilient state estimation has been also addressed for noisy systems under both data injection and switching attacks [11] .
In this work, three different classes of adversarial attacks on CPSs are considered: (i) signal attack, i.e. signal of arbitrary magnitude and location injected (with known structure) to corrupt sensor/actuator data, (ii) packet substitution attack, describing an intruder that possibly intercepts and then replaces the system-generated measurement with a fake (unstructured) one, and (iii) extra packet injection, a new type of attack against state estimation, already introduced in information security (see, e.g., [12] , [13] ), in which multiple counterfeit observations (junk packets) are possibly added to the system-generated measurement. Note that the key feature distinguishing signal attacks on sensors from packet substitution, relies on the fact that the former are assumed to alter the measurement through a given structure (i.e., known measurement function), whereas the latter mechanism captures integrity attacks that spoof sensor data packets with no care of the model structure. By considering both structured and unstructured injections, we do not restrict the type of attack the adversary can enforce on the sensor measurements. The present paper aims to address the problem of simultaneously detecting a signal attack while estimating the state of the monitored system, possibly in presence of fake measurements independently injected into the system's monitor by cyber-attackers. A random set attack modeling approach is undertaken by representing the signal attack presence/absence by means of a Bernoulli random set (i.e. a set that can be either empty or a singleton depending on the presence or not of the attack) and by taking into account possible fake measurements by means of a random measurement set represented by a Bernoulli or Poisson random set for the packet substitution or, respectively, extra packet injection attack. The joint attack detection-state estimation problem is then formulated within the Bayesian framework as the recursive determination of the joint posterior density of the signal attack Bernoulli set and of the state vector at each time given all the measurement sets available up to that time. Strictly speaking, the posed Bayesian estimation problem is neither standard [14] nor Bernoulli filtering [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] but is rather a hybrid Bayesian filtering problem that aims to jointly estimate a Bernoulli random set for the signal attack and a random vector for the system state. An analytical solution of the hybrid filtering problem has been found in terms of integral equations that generalize the Bayes and Chapman-Kolmogorov equations of the Bernoulli filter. In particular, the proposed hybrid Bernoulli Bayesian filter for joint attack detection-state estimation propagates in time, via a twostep prediction-correction procedure, a joint posterior density completely characterized by a triplet consisting of: (1) a signal attack probability; (2) a probability density function (PDF) in the state space for the system under no signal attack; (3) a PDF in the joint attack input-state space for the system under signal attack. Like standard Bernoulli filters, also the hybrid Bernoulli filter of this paper does not have, in general, a closed-form solution so that it can be practically implemented as particle or Gaussian-mixture filter.
To the best of the authors' knowledge, the proposed approach represents the first attempt to exploit stochastic random set methods in the context of (secure) monitoring of cyber-physical systems. This paper extends previous work on this topic [19] , by adding detailed proofs and a whole section dedicated to the Gaussian-mixture implementation. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the considered attack models and provides the necessary background on joint input-and-state estimation as well as on random set estimation. Section III formulates and solves the joint attack detection-state estimation problem of interest in the Bayesian framework. Section IV discusses the Gaussian-mixture implementation of the joint attack detector-state estimator derived in Section III. Then, Section V demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach via a numerical example. Finally, Section VI ends the paper with concluding remarks and perspectives for future work.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND PRELIMINARIES

A. System description and attack model
Let the discrete-time cyber-physical system of interest be modeled by
where: k is the time index; x k ∈ R n is the state vector to be estimated; a k ∈ R m , called attack vector, is an unknown input affecting the system only when it is under attack; f 0 k (·) and f 1 k (·, ·) are known state transition functions that describe the system evolution in the no attack and, respectively, attack cases; w k is a random process disturbance also affecting the system. For monitoring purposes, the state of the above system is observed through the measurement model
where: h 0 k (·) and h 1 k (·, ·) are known measurement functions that refer to the no attack and, respectively, attack cases; v k is a random measurement noise. It is assumed that the measurement y k is actually delivered to the system monitor with probability p d ∈ (0, 1], where the non-unit probability might be due to a number of reasons (e.g. temporary denial of service, packet loss, sensor inability to detect or sense the system, etc.). The attack modeled in (1)-(2) via the attack vector a k is usually referred to as signal attack. While for ease of presentation only the case of a single attack model is taken into account, multiple attack models [11] could be accommodated in the considered framework by letting (1)-(2) depend on a discrete variable, say ν k , which specifies the particular attack model and has to be estimated together with a k . Besides the system-originated measurement y k in (2), it is assumed that the system monitor might receive fake measurements from some cyber-attacker. In this respect, the following two cases will be considered.
1) Packet substitution -With some probability p f ∈ [0, 1), the attacker replaces the system-originated measurement y k with a fake one y f k . 2) Extra packet injection -The attacker sends to the monitor one or multiple fake measurements indistinguishable from the system-originated one. For the subsequent developments, it is convenient to introduce the attack set at time k, A k , which is either equal to the empty set if the system is not under signal attack at time k or to the singleton {a k } otherwise, i.e.
if the system is not under signal attack {a k }, otherwise.
It is also convenient to define the measurement set at time k, Z k . For the packet substitution attack:
where y k is given by (2) and y f k is a fake measurement provided by the attacker in place of y k . Conversely, for the extra packet injection attack the definition (3) is replaced by
where
is the set of system-originated measurements and F k the finite set of fake measurements. The aim of this paper is to address the problem of joint attack detection and state estimation, which amounts to jointly estimating, at each time k, the state x k and signal attack set A k given the set of measurements
B. Joint input and state estimation
In this section we review the formulation of the Joint Input and State Estimation (JISE) problem, already addressed for linear [20] , [21] and nonlinear [22] systems in the Bayesian framework. To this end, let us consider a system with direct feedthrough of the form
where u k is the unknown input vector. The goal of stochastic Bayesian filtering is to recursively estimate the time-varying posterior PDF of the unknown variables conditioned on all the information available up to that time. Hence, when the objective is the simultaneous input and state estimation, at each time instant k, the estimates of u k and x k can be obtained by solving the following problem.
JISE problem: For the system (6), given the measurement set y k = {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k }, sequentially compute the joint conditional PDF p(u k , x k |y k ) from p(u k−1 , x k−1 |y k−1 ).
Assuming that the initial density p(u 0 , x 0 ) is given, the solution can be described as a two-step procedure of prediction and correction. Let p(u k−1 , x k−1 |y k−1 ) denote the posterior PDF at k − 1. The prediction step computes the conditional PDF p(x k |y k−1 ) via the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation:
Then, at time instant k, the observed output y k is available and can be used to update p(x k |y k−1 ) and jointly estimate the conditional PDF of u k , y k being the first measurement containing information about the unknown signal. The correction step is then performed by applying the Bayes rule:
Note that in (8) the unknown input is treated as a white stochastic process {u k }, independent of x 0 , {w k } and {v k }. This means that u k and u l are independent random variables for k = l, and u k is independent of x k and y k−1 . With the derived Bayesian solution to JISE in the presence of direct feedthrough, optimal (with respect to any criterion) point estimates of the input and state can be obtained from this PDF, e.g. the Maximum A-posteriori Probability (MAP) estimate.
C. Random set estimation
An RFS (Random Finite Set) X over X is a random variable taking values in F(X), the collection of all finite subsets of X. The mathematical background needed for Bayesian random set estimation can be found in [16] ; here, the basic concepts needed for the subsequent developments are briefly reviewed. From a probabilistic viewpoint, an RFS X is completely characterized by its set density f (X ), also called FISST (FInite Set STatistics) probability density. In fact, given f (X ), the cardinality probability mass function p(n) that X have n ≥ 0 elements and the joint PDFs f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n |n) over X n given that X have n elements, are obtained as follows:
In order to measure probability over subsets of X or compute expectations of random set variables, Mahler [16] introduced the notion of set integral for a generic real-valued function g(X ) of an RFS X as
Two specific types of RFSs, i.e. Bernoulli and Poisson RFSs, will be considered in this work.
Bernoulli RFS
A Bernouilli RFS is a random set which can be either empty or, with some probability r ∈ [0, 1], a singleton {x} distributed over X according to the PDF p(x). Accordingly, its set density is defined as follows:
Poisson RFS
A Poisson RFS is a random finite set with Poisson-distributed cardinality, i.e.
and elements independently distributed over X according to a given spatial density p(·). Accordingly, its set density is defined as follows:
III. BAYESIAN RANDOM SET FILTER FOR JOINT ATTACK DETECTION AND STATE ESTIMATION
Let the signal attack input at time k be modeled as a Bernoulli random set A k ∈ B(A), where B(A) = ∅ ∪ S(A) is a set of all finite subsets of the attack probability space A ⊆ R m , and S denotes the set of all singletons (i.e., sets with cardinality 1) {a} such that a ∈ A. Further, let X ⊆ R n denote the Euclidean space for the system state vector, then we can define the Hybrid Bernoulli Random Set (HBRS) (A, x), as a new state variable which incorporates the Bernoulli attack random set A and the random state vector x, taking values in the hybrid space B(A) × X. A HBRS is fully specified by the (signal attack) probability r of A being a singleton, the PDF p 0 (x) defined on the state space X, and the joint PDF p 1 (a, x) defined on the joint attack input-state space A × X, i.e.
Moreover, since integration over B(A) × X takes the form
where the set integration with respect to A is defined according to (9) while the integration with respect to x is an ordinary one, it is easy to see that p(A, x) integrates to one by substituting (13) in (14), and noting that p 0 (x) and p 1 (a, x) are conventional probability density functions on X and A × X, respectively. This, in turn, guarantees that (13) is a FISST probability density for the HBRS (A, x), which will be referred to as hybrid Bernoulli density throughout the rest of the paper.
A. Measurement models and correction 1) Packet substitution: Let us consider the packet substitution attack model introduced in Section II.A and denote by λ(Z k |A k , x k ) the likelihood function of the measurement set defined in (3), which has obviously two possible forms, A k being a Bernoulli random set. In particular, for A k = ∅:
where {y k } denotes the singleton whose element represents a delivered measurement, i.e. λ({y k }|A k , x k ) is the likelihood that a single measurement y k will be collected. Furthermore, (y k |x k ) is the standard likelihood function of the system-generated measurement y k when no signal attack is present, whereas κ(·) is a PDF modeling the fake measurement y f k , assumed to be independent of the system state. Conversely, for A k = {a k }:
where (y k |a k , x k ) denotes the conventional likelihood of measurement y k , due to the system under attack a k in state x k . Notice that, by using the definition of set integral (9), it is easy to check that both forms (15) and (16) of the likelihood function λ(Z k |A k , x k ) integrate to one. Using the aforementioned measurement model, it is possible to derive the exact correction equations of the Bayesian random set filter for joint attack detection and state estimation, in case of substitution attack.
Theorem 1: Suppose that the prior density at time k is hybrid Bernoulli of the form
Then, given the measurement random set Z k defined in (3), also the posterior density at time k turns out to be hybrid Bernoulli of the form
completely specified by the triplet
Proof: The correction equation of the Bayes random set filter for joint attack detection and state estimation follows from a generalization of (8), which yields
where λ(Z k |A k , x k ) is given by (15) and (16), while
For the case Z k = ∅, the above reduces to
by substituting (15)- (16) and (17) in (26), and simply noting that p 0 k|k−1 (x k )dx k = 1 and
The posterior probability of attack existence r k|k can be obtained from the posterior density (25) with
where -using (15), (17) and (27) in (25) -we have
, and the joint density for the system under attack can be easily derived from the posterior density with
results from replacing (16), (17) and (27) in (25). Notice that from the set integral definition (9) , and densities (29)-(30), it holds that p(∅,
Hence, as stated, the Bayes correction (18) provides a hybrid Bernoulli density.
Next, for the case Z k = {y k }, (26) leads to
so that from (25) one gets
which, in turn, is used to obtain (19) through (28). Once r k|k is known, (20) immediately follows as previously shown for the case Z k = ∅, while (21) comes from dividing the posterior
by r k|k in (19) .
2) Extra packet injection:
Let us now consider the extra packet injection attack model introduced in Section II.A, for which the measurement set defined in (4) is given by the union of two independent random sets. As it is clear from (5), Y k is a Bernoulli random set (with cardinality |Y k | at most 1) which depends on whether the system-originated measurement y k is delivered or not. Conversely, F k is the random set of fake measurements that will be modeled hereafter as a Poisson random set, such that the number of counterfeit measurements is Poissondistributed according to (11) and the FISST PDF of fake-only measurements γ(F k ) is given by (12) with spatial distribution κ(·) in place of p(·). For the measurement set (4), the aim is to find the expression of the likelihood function λ(Z k |A k , x k ). To this end, let us first introduce the following FISST PDF for A k = ∅:
and for A k = {a k }:
Then, using the convolution formula [16, p. 385] , it follows that
Hence, the likelihood corresponding to A k = ∅ is given by
where (34) and (12) have been used, while for A k = {a k } we have
Using the above described measurement model, exact correction equations of the Bayesian random set filter for joint attack detection and state estimation in the case of extra packet injection attack are obtained as follows.
Theorem 2: Assume that the prior density at time k is hybrid Bernoulli of the form (17) . Then, given the measurement random set Z k defined in (4), also the posterior density at time k turns out to be hybrid Bernoulli of the form (18) , with parameters
and Γ = Γ 0 − Γ 1 .
Proof: Following the same rationale used for Theorem 1, from (26) it is first possible to derive
which is subsequently used together with (29) and (37) to obtain p(∅, x k |Z k ) from (25), and finally (39) via (28). Then, the parameters (40) and (41) can be derived from p(∅, x k |Z k ), p({a k }, x k |Z k ) and r k|k , by exploiting the likelihood functions (37)-(38) of the measurement model under consideration.
From Theorem 1 and 2, it is evident that if p d = 1 and r k|k−1 = 1, then r k|k = 1 follows from both (19) and (39). Moreover, if we further assume that no fake measurements are collected at time k, i.e. Z k = {y k }, then both (21) and (41) simplify to the standard Bayes filter correction of the JISE problem (8) . In analogous way, if r k|k−1 = 0, first we obtain r k|k = 0, then, from (20) and (40), the standard Bayes filter correction for an attack-free system:
B. Dynamic model and prediction
Let us next introduce the dynamic model of the HBRS (A, x) essential to derive the prediction equations. First, it is assumed that, in the case of a system under normal operation at time k, an attack a k+1 will be launched to the system by an adversary during the sampling interval with probability p b . On the other hand, if the system is under attack (i.e., A k is a singleton), it is supposed that the adversarial action will endure from time step k to time step k + 1 with probability p s . It is further assumed that (A, x) is a Markov process with joint transitional density
which ensues from considering the attack as a stochastic process independent of the system state, as supposed for the unknown input in Section II.B. Such an assumption is motivated by the fact that (i) a k may assume all possible values, being completely unknown (we consider the most general model for signal attacks where any value can be injected via the compromised actuators/sensors), and (ii) the knowledge of a k adds no information on a l , if k = l. In addition, note that
are known Markov transition PDF's, while the dynamics of the Markov process A k resulting from the aforestated assumptions is Bernoulli, described by the following densities:
where p(a k+1 ) is the PDF of the attack input vector. Clearly, when the attack vector is completely unknown, a non-informative PDF (e.g., uniform in the attack space) can be used as p(a k+1 ). Under the above assumptions, an exact recursion for the prior density can be obtained, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Given the posterior hybrid Bernoulli density p(A k , x k |Z k ) at time k of the form (18), fully characterized by the parameter triplet r k|k , p 0 k|k (x k ), p 1 k|k (a k , x k ) , also the predicted density turns out to be hybrid Bernoulli of the form
with parameters
Proof: The prediction equation of the Bayes random set filter is given by the following generalization of (7)
where the set integral definition (9) and (18) have been used. Then, we solve for A k+1 = ∅. From (46), (47), and (48), one has
Next, using (52) and (53), (55) becomes
Analogously, for A k+1 = {a k+1 } we obtain
Thus, the output of the prediction step given by (55)-(57) is of the form (48) under the settings (49)-(53).
It is clear from (49) that the system is predicted to be under attack at time k+1 if either an existing malicious input persists from time k, or a novel attack a k+1 starts affecting its dynamics. Similar to the standard Bernoulli filter, the prediction step of the proposed filter involves two separate terms, here accounting for attack-birth and attacksurvival. Notice that, if p b = 0, p s = 1 and r k|k = 1, the prediction step (48) yields (7), which is the standard Chapman-Kolmogorov equation for the system under attack, since from (49)-(51) it follows that r k+1|k = 1, p 0 k+1|k (x k+1 ) = 0, and p 1 k+1|k (a k+1 , x k+1 ) = p k+1|k (x k+1 |{a k }) p(a k+1 ).
IV. GAUSSIAN-MIXTURE IMPLEMENTATION
Although no exact closed-form solution to the Bayes optimal recursion is admitted in general, for the special class of linear Gaussian models it is possible to analytically propagate in time the posterior densities p 0 k|k (·) and p 1 k|k (·) in the form of Gaussian mixtures (weights, means and covariances), and the probability of signal attack r k|k . Note that in the case of nonlinear models and/or non-Gaussian noises, the solution can be obtained via nonlinear extensions of the GM approximation (e.g. Unscented/Extended GM) or sequential Monte Carlo methods (i.e. particle filter).
Denoting by N (x; m, P ) a Gaussian PDF in the variable x, with mean m and covariance P , the closed-form solution assumes linear Gaussian observation, transition, and (a priori) attack models, i.e.
as well as state independent survival and measurement delivery probabilities p s and p d , i.e.
Note that (62) uses given model parameters J a ,ω a,j ,ã j ,P a,j , j = 1, . . . , J a , to define the a priori PDF of the signal attack, here expressed as a Gaussian mixture and supposed time independent. In the GM implementation, each probability density at time k is represented by the following set of parameters
where ω and J indicate, respectively, weights and the number of mixture components, such that
, and
The weights are such that 1) GM-HBF correction for packet substitution: Proposition 1: Suppose assumptions (58)-(64) hold, the measurement set Z k is defined by (3), the predicted FISST density at time k is fully specified by the triplet r k|k−1 , p 0 k|k−1 (x k ), p 1 k|k−1 (a k , x k ) , and p 0 k|k−1 (·), p 1 k|k−1 (·) are Gaussian mixtures of the form
Then, the posterior FISST density r k|k , p 0
where ω 0,j Proof: From Theorem 1, the corrected probability of signal attack existence can be directly written from (19) as
where Ψ 0 is obtained by substituting (58) and (68) into (22) , so that
Then, by applying a standard result for Gaussian functions [23, Lemma 1], we can write
where q 0,j
and, hence, (78) takes the form
Moreover, Ψ 1 in (70) can be analogously obtained by substituting (59) and (69) into (23), and by applying Lemma 1 in [23] to the (double) integral
k|k−1 ) da k dx k , so as to obtain
where q
and m
Next, the posterior density p 0 k|k (·) can be derived from (20) in Theorem 1 as
By substituting (58) and (68) into (84), we obtain
Then, by applying Lemma 2 in [23] , we can write
where q 
Thus, by substituting (86) into (85) with means and covariances given by (87)- (88), we can write
which comprises 2 J 0 k|k−1 components, i.e. 
with weights ω 0,j
Note that, as it can be seen from (92), it turns out that J 0 k|k = 2 J 0 k|k−1 , where the first legacy (not corrected) components correspond to the hypothesis of the system-originated measurement being replaced by a fake one y f k , while the remaining components are the ones corrected under the hypothesis of receiving y k with probability
Following the same rationale, analogous results can be obtained for p 1 k|k (·), with the exception that also signal attack estimation has to be performed. By substituting (59) and (69) into (21) in Theorem 1, we obtain
where q k|k can be calculated following the correction step of the filter for joint input and state estimation of linear discrete-time systems [20] , introduced in Section II.B. In particular, m 1,j k|k consists of:
The elements composing P 1,j k|k can be computed as
Thus, by substituting (96) into (95) with means and covariances given by (97)- (98) and (103)- (105), we can write
which comprises 2 J 1 k|k−1 components, i.e.
with weights
2) GM-HBF correction for extra packet injection: Proposition 2: Suppose assumptions (58)-(64) hold, the measurement set Z k is defined by (4), the predicted FISST density at time k is fully specified by the triplet r k|k−1 , p 0 k|k−1 (x k ), p 1 k|k−1 (a k , x k ) , and p 0 k|k−1 (·), p 1 k|k−1 (·) are Gaussian mixtures of the form (68) and (69), respectively. Then, the posterior FISST density r k|k , p 0
and
Proof: We first derive the corrected probability of signal attack existence, which can be directly written from (39) as
where Γ 0 is obtained by substituting (58) and (68) into (42), so that
Then, by applying (79), (118) takes the form (115). Moreover, Γ 1 in (117) can be analogously obtained by substituting (59) and (69) into (43), and by applying (96) which leads to (116). Next, the posterior density p 0 k|k (·) can be derived from (40) in Theorem 2 as
By substituting (58) and (68) into (119), we obtain
Thus, by substituting (79) into (120), with means and covariances given by (87)-(88), we can write
which comprises J 0 k|k−1 (1 + |Z k |) components, where |Z k | denotes the cardinality of the measurement set Z at time k, i.e. 
Note that, as it can be seen from (122), it turns out that J 0
, where the first legacy components correspond to the fact that no measurement has been delivered and hence no update is carried out, while the remaining components are the ones corrected when one or multiple measurements are received.
Following the same rationale, analogous results can be obtained for p 1 k|k (·). From (41) in Theorem 2:
By substituting (59) and (69) into (125), we obtain
Thus, by substituting (96) into (126), with means and covariances given by (97)- (98) and (103)- (105), we can write
which comprises J 1 k|k−1 (1 + |Z k |) components, i.e.
3) GM-HBF prediction: Proposition 3: Suppose assumptions (58)- (64) hold, the posterior FISST density at time k is fully specified by the triplet r k|k , p 0 k|k (x k ), p 1 k|k (a k , x k ) , and p 0 k|k (·), p 1 k|k (·) are Gaussian mixtures of the form (66)-(67). Then the predicted FISST density r k+1|k , p 0
where (132) 
and 
and m 1,jh
Proof: The predicted signal attack probability comes directly from (49). Let us now derive the predicted density p 0 k|k (·). From (50) in Theorem 3:
Using (60), (66) in the first term and (61), (67) in the second term, we can rewrite
Hence, using Lemma 1 from [23] in both the above terms, we finally derive (134):
In a similar fashion, we can obtain p 1 k+1|k (·). From (51) in Theorem 3:
which, using (60), (66), (61), (67) and (62), leads to
Finally, by applying the same result on integrals of Gaussians used above, we obtain (141):
It is worth pointing out that, likewise other GM filters (e.g. [23] ), also the proposed Gaussian Mixture Hybrid Bernoulli Filter turns out to be affected by computational issues as the number of Gaussian components increases with no bound over time. As already noticed in the above derivation, at time k the GM-HBF requires
, extra packet injection components to exactly represent the posterior densities p 0 k|k (·) and p 1 k|k (·), respectively. Here
) denote the number of components generated in the prediction step. In order to reduce the growing amount of GM components, simple heuristic pruning and merging procedures presented in [23] can be directly performed at each time step so as to remove low-weight components and combine statistically close components. For a better understanding of the GM-HBF recursion presented in Propositions 2 and 3, a pseudocode of the Gaussian mixture HB filter for both correction (extra packet injection) and prediction steps is provided in Table I and, respectively,  Table II. From Tables I and II , it is clear that if the initial prior densities p 0 1|0 (·), p 1 1|0 (·) are Gaussian mixtures, then all the following corrected and predicted densities will be Gaussian mixtures as well. 
5: end for 6: 
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, a simple simulation case-study will be presented so as to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of the proposed Bayesian random-set approach for resilient CPS state estimation, in the presence of signal and extra packet injection attacks, as well as uncertainty on measurement delivery.
Let us consider the following benchmark linear system, obtained from the example in [11] :
where A, C, R, and Q are the same as [11] , while G = [e 1 e 2 ] and H = [e 3 e 1 ], where e 1 , . . . , e n are the canonical basis vectors. For this numerical study, the probabilities of attack-birth and attack-survival are fixed, respectively, at p b = 0.2 and p s = 0.8. The system-generated measurement is supposed to be delivered at the monitor/control center with probability p d = 0.98, while the initial signal attack probability is set to r 1|0 = 0.1. The initial state has been set equal to x 0 = 0, whereas both densities p 0 (·) and p 1 (·) have been initialized as single Gaussian components with first guess meanx 0 1|0 = [10, 10, 0, 0, 0] T and covariance P 0 1|0 = 10 4 I. Moreover, in the performed simulation the first estimate of the attack vector has been randomly initialized asã 1|0 = [15.1, 25 .53] T , with associated initial covariance matrixP a 1|0 = 50I. The extra fake measurements injected into the sensor channel are modeled as a Poisson RFS, introduced in Section II.C, uniformly distributed over the interval [−0.3, 140.3] , with average number ξ = 0.5. Finally, a pruning threshold T = 10 −3 and a merging threshold U = 3 have been chosen. As shown in Fig.1 , at time k = 150 a signal attack vector a k = [10, 20] T is injected into the system, persisting for 200 time steps. The proposed GM-HBF promptly detects the unknown signal attack, by simply comparing the attack probability r k|k obtained in (39) with the threshold 0.5. Fig. 2 provides a comparison values of states x 1 and x 2 (clearly the only state components affected by the signal attack). Note that the state estimate is obtained by means of a MAP estimator, i.e. by extracting the Gaussian mean with the highest weight from the posterior density p 0 (·) (40) or p 1 (·) (41), accordingly with the current value of the attack probability.
Finally, Fig. 3 shows how the attack estimates extracted from p(a) of the two components of the attack vector, coincide with the actual values inside the attack interval [150, 350] . Notice that outside that interval the estimates of the attack vector are not meaningful because the attack probability r k|k is almost 0.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The paper has addressed resilient state estimation for cyber-physical systems considering both switching signal attacks and fake measurement injection. Random (Bernouilli and/or Poisson) finite sets have been exploited to model the switching nature of the signal attack as well as the possible presence of fake measurements, and a Bayesian random set estimation problem has been formulated for jointly detecting a signal attack and estimating the system state. In this way, a hybrid Bernoulli filter for the Bayes-optimal solution of the posed problem has been derived and implemented as a Gaussian-sum filter. A numerical example has been presented to demonstrate the potentials of the proposed approach. Future work will concern performance assessment of the developed filter and its application to resilient state estimation for power systems.
